What is happening?
Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference (FIMI) campaigns are frequently used by various actors and countries in Kosovo to manipulate or undermine confidence in institutions and the democratic system. Countries such as China have different strategies when it comes to applying FIMI tactics in the Western Balkans, and specifically in Kosovo. China’s playbook in Kosovo diverges from approaches by other countries, as it is quieter, and does not consist of significant investment but of activity in the information domain.
As a 2023 study from Kosovo by the Balkan Investigative Reporting Network shows evidence pf pro-China narratives disseminated through online media. Content that aligns with Chinese state narratives has been found in different sources. These stories tend to depict China as a responsible and positive international player and Western nations in a more ambivalent or negative sense. Even though Kosovo is a highly pro-Western country, such initiatives can influence perceptions over time.
The Story of Our Lies, as the report is titled, gives specific insight into how this works. It also highlights cases of re-publication or re-posting of material from Chinese state-backed outlets such as Radio Ejani (the Albanian-language service of China Media Group) and China Radio International or by sources that represent Beijing’s views in Kosovo media, without appropriate context and citation. This is important as people in Kosovo receive and analyze information from local media differently than they do reports from Chinese state media. Such findings align with those published in an article by Reporters Without Borders (RSF) in March 2026, which describes China’s media strategy as one that blends state messaging into local information environments to increase credibility. While the RSF article is focused on Latin American countries, the strategy matches Beijing’s approach in Kosovo.
Beijing’s increasing economic presence is another layer in this dynamic. In recent years, China has been one of Kosovo’s leading import partners, with products ranging from industrial equipment to consumer electronics becoming embedded in the local market. Although these trade flows are observable and quantifiable, the media content and advertising around them are not.
The ambiguous ways in which companies associated with such supply chains promote their products leaves room for indirect influence, as commercial messages can take on an advertorial character without explicit indication. According to Kosovo Customs statistics, the value of imports from China increased from 452 million euros in 2021 to 841 million euros in the first 11 months of 2025. A report published in September 2025 by the Kosovo Center for Security Studies claims that, while corporate participation is frequently motivated by short-term profit, there is little consideration for the long-term political and security implications.
This influence is notably not as powerful as in bigger European markets, but it indicates a long-term intention of shaping elite and public perceptions gradually over time. China’s playbook in Kosovo does not emphasize the need to dominate the information space with its narrative. Instead, the aim is to foster a persistent narrative that is credible enough to influence discourse over time. Through such means, Beijing hopes to influence the information environment, translating its success there into economic or political outcomes.
The key issue is, thus, not visibility but continuing influence. Beijing’s maneuvers generate a structural asymmetry, as the economic aspect can be seen and quantified, whereas intervention in the information domain remains unwritten and hard to track. Chinese propaganda in Kosovo is not designed to take immediate control but to transform perceptions bit by bit, particularly on governance models and global partnerships. If successful, this could undermine citizens’ confidence in Western institutions and democratic values, making Kosovo’s Euro-Atlantic path more complex. Since the Western Balkans has a strategic value for European Union integration and NATO cohesion, any minor shifts in mindsets among the public or officials could hold extended geopolitical value for Beijing.
This highlights why European stakeholders, especially those in Southeast Europe, must be actively involved in pushing back against Beijing’s incursions into the information space. The enhancement of media literacy, the provision of transparency of information flows, and the reinforcement of partnerships with democratic players are the main elements of resilience. The experience of countries such as the Czech Republic indicates that early identification of the influence pattern, in conjunction with political positioning, is decisive in mitigating long-term risk.
After all, the experience of China in Kosovo is evidence of a larger tendency: The new form of influence is not about power but sustainability. Subtle, active, and integrated strategies can be more effective in shaping the information environment than overt campaigns.
EVC, April 2026